September update

Dear readers,

Please excuse me for not having updated the blog for the past 2+ weeks - it is not that I didn't have much to say or observe - quite the contrary!

But a perfect storm of a hectic schedule, preparations for another long stay in Senegal (from whence I write today), and sadly, the passing of Sito (the preferred Arabic word to call one's grandmother) Gertrude Fattell Ajjan, who was 84, made keeping up to date with the blog all the more difficult. May God have mercy on her.

On a brighter note, you will notice (and hopefully enjoy) the new expanded 3-column look of the blog, which penalizes my overseas cybercafe readers with 800x600 displays (sorry guys), but offers the vast majority more content on-screen and easier access to clips of my tv appearances, which I hope will continue.

I plan to update with a series of quick posts getting up-to-date, and inshallah I will regain my usual pace shortly.

Best,
George
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Jindalicious

Back in 2004, I attended the "candidate school" organized by the NRCC (National Republican Congressional Committee), which was essentially a crash course in how to keep an underfunded campaign afloat. It was helpful, I admit.

Anyway, one of the presenters was the guy who did the mailers for Bobby Jindal's race for Governor back in 2003. He made a point to show that he designed Jindal's mailer differently than others, with more text and detail - to show just how technically savvy Jindal was. To illustrate his point, he recalled one of the live debates in which Jindal was asked about a particular health-care issue. Jindal quickly replied, "I have 4 things to say about that..." After the debate, the consultant asked him why he chose 4. Jindal said, "Well, I had 2 on the top of my head, and I figured that while I explained those, 2 more would come to me." The consultant's synopsis: "That's just how smart this guy is."

According to NJ's walking conservative litmus test, Rick Shaftan, Jindal only lost that race because at the end it was all about "the 1st Indian American blah-blah-blah" and not about the guy's smarts and know-how. No matter, he went on to win a congressional seat with the support of controversial far-left New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin, and get re-elected as well in 2006. Overlooking some neoconservative moments, like waving around the "neocon blue" finger during the 2005 State of the Union address to celebrate Iraq's first post-Baath election (who cares if the Republic is fading away - the Imperial provinces are having elections!), Jindal has proved himself a worthy elected official and will likely ascend to the Louisiana governorship.

To that end, I had the opportunity to see him speak to a group of business leaders in NYC a couple of weeks ago, and he did a great job. His grasp of the issues is impressive, and I believe he will clean house down there. He is acutely aware of Louisiana's industrial downturn, and that the state has not adapted to the fact that companies do not see the need to locate there anymore. Jindal mentioned something about preventing Louisiana from becoming "Jamaica without the beaches".

Finally, let me point out that Jindal is a role-model as far as ethnic candidates go. Naturally, he has a lot of support from other Americans of South Asian origin scattered across the US, but the supporters he attracted in NYC were the same Republican donors that any "traditional" candidate would attract.

Well done, Bobby. And I love the accent.
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Another New Jersey Now appearance

On September 16, I had my third appearance on My9's "New Jersey Now", this time opposite the formidable Mike Murphy from Morris County, who formerly served as County Prosecutor, and ran against Jim McGreevey for Governor in the 1997 primary.

This clip was shorter than the other appearances, but it covered the Petraeus Report and the moderator Harry Martin asked me about being a Republican blogger as well, which was great. Thanks again to producers Ronica Harris and Joe Silvestri.



see also a segment featuring Congressman Scott Garrett from the same show, on the RedJersey YouTube page.
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My Brave New iWorld

When Apple instituted price cuts for the iPhone, I decided it was time to get on board, especially since I am already on AT&T and since the unlocking mechanism had been thoroughly validated (enabling me to use my overseas SIM cards in the phone).

A hint - I bought it refurbished from Apple for $349 plus tax, which essentially is the sum I will collect by selling my old iPod, my old piece-of-crap Motorola L7 (SLVR), and my old Canon digital camera - since the iPhone has all-in-one, I can essentially upgrade for free.

2 caveats:

1. the camera is very limited (no zoom)
2. internet access will cost me $20 extra per month as mandated by AT&T.

That is well-worth it though, considering that I have mobile email/internet access for the first time ever, and what a treat! Even in Senegal, if I find a WiFi zone, I'm online on the road. Very cool.

Complaints:

• the Safari browser doesn't display Arabic characters (or any other non-latin alphabet, for that matter)
• no video camera
• no cut and paste on email

But overall, I'm thrilled!
continue reading "My Brave New iWorld..."

al-Qaeda's preferred beverage outlet

The following review of Rudy Giuliani's foreign policy outline was published on The Intellectual Conservative, a webzine featuring excellent commentary on domestic and international issues, with a slant toward paleoconservative and libertarian ideas.
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One day during the summer of 2002, during a 3-month internship in the UAE between the 2 years of my MBA studies at the London Business School, I was strolling through Dubai City Centre (one of the city's many air-conditioned mega-malls) when I saw a teenager, apparently of local origin judging by the way his garments were configured, walking around the mall wearing a t-shirt bearing the likeness of Osama bin Laden.

One might imagine, given the young man's taste in sportswear, that such an individual bore great resentment toward the United States and "the West" in general. Yet, he unceremoniously sipped from a medium-size beverage cup bearing the logo of McDonald's.

This incident came immediately to mind after reading Norman Podhoretz's...rather, Rudy Giuliani's foreign policy outline submitted to Foreign Affairs magazine. (See also the outlines of Mitt Romney and Barack Obama, as well as John Edwards.) For those unfamiliar with Rudy Giuliani, he is the greatest hero in American history, and if he emerges with the Republican nomination, he is expected to win the 2008 Presidential election in my home state of New Jersey with 103.5% of the vote.

Giuliani's article was rife with contradictions, predicated upon a faulty framework for evaluating terrorism. Quite simply, he and all the other neocon Kool Aid drinkers have not understood that the struggle for order and stability, or the "international system" as Giuliani calls it, is a choice between states and statelessness. The neocons haven't yet grasped this – they may claim otherwise, but they still cling to their Cold War framework of good states vs. bad states.

Before expounding upon that, consider the passage of Giuliani's piece that sparked the memory of my Dubai experience, among the most ridiculous of his propositions:

"Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are pointing the way by tarting to interpret Islam in ways that respect the distinctiveness of their local cultures but are consistent with the global marketplace. Some of these states have coeducational schools, allow women to serve in government, and count shopping malls that sell Western and Arab goods side by side. Their leaders recognize that modernization is their ticket to the global marketplace. And the global marketplace can build bridges between the West and the Islamic world in a way that promotes mutual respect and mutual benefit."

For a man who boasts that he has visited 35 countries since leaving the mayoralty of New York, he doesn't seem to have learned a whole lot, expect perhaps that sycophants can make a person feel smarter than what he is.

Giuliani's statement is so misinformed, it's hard to choose where to begin debunking it. First of all, the countries that he mentioned are not really in the business of "interpreting Islam," other than to recognize very general components of Islamic culture, such as respecting Friday as a day of communal prayer and structuring national schedules accordingly (like Israel does for Saturday and the US does for Sunday). Giuliani seems to think that the austerity and government-enforced Islamic social guidelines mandated by the Saudi regime or the Taliban are the norm, while in fact they are the exception. What percentage of Islamic countries do not have co-educational schools, allow women to serve in government, or sell "Western and Arab goods side by side?" (How patronizing...) A very small minority. Even Iraq under the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein always had women in prominent roles. And the government of Syria brews its own beer.

The main trait that Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE have in common is that they are all allied with the US politically/militarily/economically. Accordingly, Jordan's "King" Abdallah earns accolades as a "reformer," I suppose because Coach handbags are sold duty-free at the border crossing between Jordan and Iraq. What, pray tell, was the margin of victory the last time he was elected "king?"

Of course, all of these misconceptions are related to the neoconservatives' obsession with "democracy," which they have turned into the cheapest word in the English language, roughly defined as:

"absolute compliance with and slavish obedience to whatever our regional agenda happens to be for the next 15 minutes."

Further arrogance in Giuliani's view manifests in his suggestion that modernization can only come from a strong relationship with the United States. I don't know what Giuliani saw in those 35 countries he visited, but in the 28 I have passed through I have seen that plenty of nations are getting along just fine with modernization and globalization without much American influence at all. Take Africa for instance, where Chinese products and industries dominate the market, and American goods have only gained a foothold in specific sectors (comme les 4×4 de luxe).

As for the Middle East, Giuliani has it wrong there too. Modernization and globalization do not at all go hand-in-hand with approval of the political/military plans of the United States. I suppose it never occurred to Giuliani that a young Muslim's ability to enjoy a shake from McDonald's subtracts nothing from his admiration and hero-worship of an evil man whose claim to infamy is his commitment to the taking of innocent American lives, as my Dubai experience illustrated. Quite the contrary, when Giuliani says:

"Companies such as Pepsi, Coca-Cola, McDonald's, and Levi's helped win the Cold War by entering the Soviet market. Cultural events, such as Van Cliburn's concerts in the Soviet Union...also hastened change..."

...he displays no understanding of the crisis of America's image in the minds of young Arabs and Muslims, and relies upon outdated clichés to support his view. The fact that stars like Enrique Iglesias perform to rave reviews in Damascus or that Facebook is full of groups like "Bring the Red Hot Chili Peppers to Syria" does little to change America's damaged regional image in the minds of Arab and Muslim youth.

That is on the individual level. On the state level, America's regional foes, Syria and Iran, have pressed on with globalization and seen massive inflows of capital from the Gulf states in real estate, technology, tourism, and manufacturing sectors, despite being sanctioned by the US. Additionally, Iran has inked a multi-year $100 Billion oil deal with China. Of course, modernization would progress more rapidly with American influence, and this is a worthy goal of the United States' trade policy, but globalization (as its name suggests) is not wholly controlled by America.

Iran is a good example to use because Giuliani’s animosity towards it suggests that it is outside the "international system" he wishes to strengthen as one of the three pillars of his foreign policy. But the framework of that very policy actually places Iran inside the system. For starters, Giuliani defines our enemies as those who:

"follow a violent ideology: radical Islamic fascism, which uses the mask of religion to further totalitarian goals and aims to destroy the existing international system. These enemies wear no uniform. They have no traditional military assets. They rule no states but can hide and operate in virtually any of them and are supported by some."

He continues:

"Our old assumptions about conflict between nation-states fell away. Civilization itself, and the international system, had come under attack by a ruthless and radical Islamist enemy...[the challenge] will be to strengthen the international system that the terrorists seek to destroy."

This seems to suggest that the international system consists of stable states, which terrorists wish to undermine, and that radical Islamists are the enemy. It's a sensible and logical argument, except that it contradicts Giuliani's actual agenda in what he calls the "Terrorists' War on Us" (formerly known as the "War on Terror").

Of Iran, Giuliani says:

"The Islamic Republic has been determined to attack the international system throughout its entire existence: it took U.S. diplomats hostage in 1979 and seized British sailors in 2007 and during the decades in between supported terrorism and murder."

Does he deny that Iran is a state? How could Iran have closed a major oil deal with China if it was not part of the international system? What about regular arrivals and departures of commercial flights run by Alitalia, Air France, and BMED (British Airways/BMI)? In fact, following the capture of British sailors earlier this year, the former prisoners flew home aboard one of these flights, which are usually dominated by civilian businessmen and tourists.

According to Giuliani, the case against Iran consists of 2 incidents separated by 28 years and broad references to "terrorism and murder" in between. True, Iranian leaders have made troubling, anti-American statements repeatedly and the United States has every reason to be concerned about Iranian access to nuclear technology. But bellicose statements do not alone remove a nation from the "international system;" rather, uncooperative nations must be dealt with through the tools of that system, be they diplomatic, political, economic, or yes, military in cases where America's sovereignty is directly threatened.

Nearly every other nation, including staunch American allies, retains diplomatic relations with Iran. And America too should consider re-evaluating the diplomatic freeze that has lasted nearly 3 decades. In addition to a mere consular presence that could facilitate people-to-people cultural exchanges, a full-blown embassy would enable espionage and the gathering of more reliable information than we tend to obtain from unsavory exiles, as Ted Galen Carpenter has argued.

Giuliani relies on more regional clichés when he states:

"The theocrats ruling Iran need to understand that we can wield the stick as well as the carrot, by undermining popular support for their regime, damaging the Iranian economy, weakening Iran's military, and, should all else fail, destroying its nuclear infrastructure."

It is unclear how he proposes to undermine popular support for the Iranian regime, and what he means by the "regime." Does he refer to the clerics and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, Assembly of Experts leader Hashemi Rafsanjani, or President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? What about the elected parliament? Iranian politics are far more complex than Giuliani seems to grasp, and for all of its flaws (such as the clerics' ability to reject insufficiently "Islamic" candidates for the parliament), it is a Republic and it is a state. Accordingly, Giuliani is quite correct when he says:

"There is no realistic alternative to the sovereign state system. Transnational terrorists and other rogue actors have difficulty operating where the state system is strong, and they flourish where it is weak. This is the reason they try to exploit its weaknesses."

This is exactly why we must learn to negotiate with states like Iran, however wide and long-standing the gaps, to cooperate to defeat terrorist organizations; for example, the intelligence sharing on al-Qaeda that developed between the US and Iran immediately following 9/11. Their intelligence services are far more accomplished and regionally connected than ours, which is why we must seek out ways to enlist their help in crushing disruptive terrorist organizations that can harm energy supplies and disrupt regional or even global economies.

Giuliani speaks of the "international state system" as "the primary defense of civilization," and says that:

"America can no longer rely on Cold War doctrines such as 'mutual assured destruction' in the face of threats from hostile, unstable regimes."

While no one would deny that Iran has expressed hostile intentions in the past, to suggest that states not allied with the United States are not part of civilization eclipses the current US President at even his most arrogant. As for "mutual assured destruction," one would hope, after seeing the Presidents of Iran and Israel shake hands and engage in pleasantries at the funeral of Pope John Paul II, that perhaps cooler heads will prevail over the anti-Israel rhetoric that tends to flow from Mr. Ahmadinejad's tongue.

But Giuliani rejects such "diplomatic accommodation with hostile states" as one of the vices of the "realist" foreign policy school of thought, which "avoids attempts to reform the international system according to our values." Along those lines, Giuliani voices support for the Bush policy of intervening to promote democracy and human rights in other nations (though he wisely backs off the establishment of elections as a sole criteria for "democracy") and goes so far as to say:

"Preserving and extending American ideals must remain the goal of all U.S. policy, foreign and domestic."

Thus, he proposes offering NATO membership to US allies around the global, expanding the organization well beyond its current geography and transforming it into a mini-UN without dissenters.

Judging by these statements, the source of Giuliani's positions seems to be the stubborn worldview of his advisors, even if it flies in the face of the US Constitution and the finest traditions of American foreign policy. The tone of his diplomatic approach is clearly set when he says:

"The task of a president is not merely to set priorities but to ensure that they are pursued across the government...Members of Congress who talk directly to rogue regimes at cross-purposes with the White House are not practicing diplomacy; they are undermining it."

What, then, of fact-finding missions by members of Congress who may wish to evaluate claims made against these "rogue regimes" before making decisions on the need for authorizing force or (imagine this) declaring war according to Article I, Section 8?

Quite simply, the foreign policy of a Rudy Giuliani presidency would further jeopardize American sovereignty in an unrealistic attempt to project American values on the rest of the world's nations. The threat of terrorism to the "international system" to which Giuliani is so keenly attached must certainly be confronted, but not in a manner that would forsake the advice given by George Washington in his farewell address:

"Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all...In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated...Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest."

George Ajjan is a Republican activist from Clifton, NJ who runs the blog "The Aleppine Elephant." He is also the creator of REDchoice, an issue-based online poll for the 2008 Presidential Republican Primary that utilizes conjoint analysis to identify voter preferences.

o --- This article first appeared on The Intellectual Conservative on September 12, 2007.

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Square-off on Syria with Jillian Becker

Noted British conservative Derek Turner invited me to contribute a foreign policy piece to the newly relaunched UK conservative journal Quarterly Review in the Autumn issue. We decided to have a pair of dueling articles:

• Me arguing for the diplomatic engagement of Syria and pushing for peace with Israel in order to enhance America's credibility and create positive regional momentum
• Author Jillian Becker advancing the preferred neoconservative position of isolating Syria

I will place my piece first, followed by Jillian's.
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The Road to Damascus

GEORGE AJJAN says that George Bush could have helped cool the temperature in the Middle East – and made himself a positive legacy – by brokering an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement

America's mid-term congressional elections of last November proved a disastrous defeat for the Republican Party, and one heavily influenced by the White House's approach to Iraq and the Middle East. President Bush nonetheless moved into 2007 with an unfazed foreign policy platform, as evidenced by his State of the Union address and the unveiling of his "surge" plan for Iraq. All of his actions and statements suggested a continued effort to foster the "new Middle East" fantasized in the neoconservative world-view so beloved by his closest advisors. The President clearly decided to stick to his guns, despite the region's less than cheerful reception of his lofty concepts and a Congress now run by his liberal foes.

Given those unfavourable conditions both at home and abroad, the President at that point should have reconsidered his foreign policy strategy, principally by downplaying his ideological vision and instead focusing on delivering tangible diplomatic results. Looking toward his last two years in the White House, during the window before the 2008 presidential contest began to really heat up, the President still had the time and resources to score a substantial victory in the Middle East for the sake of America's regional credibility – not to mention the Republican Party's short-term viability and of course, his own legacy. (continued...)

How might he have done that? Well, consider America's diplomatic activities in the Middle East during the last two decades. First, we have George HW Bush's Madrid Peace Conference – the brainchild of former Secretary of State and longtime Bush family confidant James Baker, who skillfully brought Israel alongside Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine to execute a comprehensive peace less than a year after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War. Thanks to a big-eared Texan named Ross Perot who earned about 20% of the vote as a 3rd party candidate in the 1992 election, the original Madrid plan was never realized, and instead the Baker approach was replaced by Bill Clinton's amateurish divide-and-conquer efforts. The idea that Clinton was a valiant and responsible peacemaker – it is mind-boggling to think that the man who accomplished nothing in the Middle East other than an Israel-Jordan peace treaty executed in 1994 still enjoys such a heroic reputation even amongst Arabs – is just another media-generated hoax.

Anyone familiar with recent American diplomacy concerning Israel and its neighbours knows that the quickest and surest way to achieve results, especially considering the political, economic, and moral meltdown in the West Bank and Gaza over the past few years – a result of American neglect, Israeli retribution and Palestinian incompetence – is to deal directly with the Syrian Arab Republic. Unlike Palestine, Syria, however belligerent at times, is a sovereign and stable republic with a qualified track record of sustainable diplomacy. The land in question, the Golan Heights, has fewer religious implications than the other territories occupied by Israel, as well as far less settlers. Thus an Israel/Syria peace deal represents the lowest hanging presidential legacy fruit in the whole orchard.

Unfortunately, Bush and his advisors failed to see the benefit, in their adamancy to punish those who obstructed the spread of "democracy" in the Middle East, and Syria was at the top of their list. By contrast, the White House should have realized that the key to peace in the region is to offer Israel's Arab neighbours sufficient incentive to disarm militant groups like Hezbollah themselves. Last summer's Lebanon invasion demonstrated that very clearly. Despite having the strongest military in the region by far, Israel has found it logistically and politically impossible to completely wipe out terrorists operating from beyond its northern borders. Only the Arabs themselves can clean their own houses. For that reason, the best solution remains a "land for peace" treaty between Israel and Syria brokered by the United States.

While voicing such an opinion in America invites irrational criticisms and rebuke, the idea has ironically received a spirited airing in Israel itself. Since last summer's war, "land for peace" has perhaps been the single hottest topic of debate in the Israeli press, especially following reports of secret negotiations between agents of Tel Aviv and Damascus and the visit of a Syrian operative close to the Assad family to testify before the Knesset. Israeli pundits recognize that, if successful, such an agreement would offer the lasting peace of mind that Israeli citizens rightfully require by "outsourcing" crackdowns against terrorists to the Syrian government, which would include cutting off vital Iranian weapon supplies. Of course the Syrians have never done anything for free - the price for their cooperation in helping disarm Hezbollah would be the return of the Golan Heights, sought for over three decades.

Though Syria has more accountability than non-state entities like Hamas or Hezbollah, mutual mistrust still underlies its dealings with Israel. That is why the United States must play a facilitating role. Israelis will certainly not be satisfied with the cocktail-party talk of their former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who once said, "The Syrians keep their commitments". To give Israelis the insurance they demand, the Americans could guarantee that Syria would stick to its word by discreetly getting all of its major trade partners, including Russia, China, and other Asian nations, to agree to blacklist Syria's Central Bank if any shenanigans continued after the territories were returned. Such restrictions would destroy Syria's ability to import and would quickly lead the country to ruin, and the regime to collapse. The regime would never take such a risk.

Inside the Beltway, however, swaggering Congressional Democrats are surely delighted that Bush has rejected the possibility of any such deal. They watch happily as Bush finishes his eight years bogged down in Iraq, with Palestine in a shambles, plus horribly strained relations with Syria. With their eyes on the White House in 2008, the Democrats hearken back to President Clinton and the so-called progress he made with the Oslo Accords of 1993 and his near success at reaching an agreement between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat in 2000, most obviously indicated by Hillary Clinton's invocation of the words "my husband…" every time her credentials appear thin. Of course, the Democrats will conveniently forget to mention the shadiness of that Camp David proposal and Clinton's audacious irresponsibility in trying to end a decades-long conflict in a horribly rushed manner practically minutes before he left office. But still, the Democrats are savouring the opportunity to sell the American public in 2008 the image of an ineffectual GOP Middle East effort fumbled along by Bush, contrasted with their description of a Democrat Party that is tough on terrorism but proven effective at facilitating the peace process.

Bush, on the other hand, shortsightedly decided that rewarding the uncooperative behaviour of Syria did not even warrant consideration. But if he had even reluctantly accepted the logic of pushing the Israel-Syria track, his gains would have been clear: in addition to weakening the regional influence of Iran, and bolstering next year's GOP presidential nominee by providing the Republican Party with solid peacemaking credentials, he would have secured an enviable presidential legacy as a formidable Middle East negotiator, exceeding that of his father or Clinton by far. Whatever red marks history will give him for his Mesopotamian misadventure, a peace treaty between Syria and Israel, ending a substantial 60 year struggle and taming the most vociferous Arab nation, would have preserved George W. Bush's place one of the most accomplished foreign policy presidents in modern American history.

But it was not to be. Those recognizing the wisdom of a peace deal, therefore, can only hope that when the keys to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue change hands in January 2009, the new tenant turns his/her attention to Israel and Syria, if only for the sake of a presidential legacy.

What sort of behaviour, though, might we expect from the various contenders for the White House? Well, judging by campaign rhetoric, the Republicans almost to a man (Ron Paul) will uphold the status quo of pouting about Syria's behaviour and endlessly harping on the trickle of two or three foreign fighters per day whose incursion from Syria into Iraq will match the current number of US troops in about 75 years or so, according to their current rate.

The GOP field continues to advance the terrorism=Iran=Syria argument and makes no real distinction between Sunni, Shiite, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Hamas, Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Iran. The simplistic nature of their argument should come as no surprise, because the major candidates' neoconservative credentials need little introduction. Rudy Giuliani's foreign policy team includes pundit Norman Podhoretz, a decades-long fixture in the neoconservative movement who recently called the Iraq War "an amazing success" and added:

"This picture of a country in total chaos with no security is false. It couldn't have gone better."

John McCain has long rested firmly in the neocon camp, and Mitt Romney submitted a lengthy foreign policy outline to Foreign Affairs magazine with barely a mention of the Middle East peace process – although he does deserve credit for recognizing the benefits of regional free trade, he believes it possible without first solving the geopolitical issues. Fred Thompson, who will probably be a declared candidate in the Republican Primary by the time you read this, has signed on none other than the Liz Cheney (the daughter of the current Vice President Dick Cheney, who was given plum appointments in the State Department presumably to run interference for her father's agenda,) as his foreign policy adviser.

But in cynical 21st century American politics, diplomacy is yet another political football, so the Democrats conveniently take the opposite tact of embracing the idea of dialogue with Syria. Barack Obama best summarized the sentiments of the liberal base when he stated in the CNN/YouTube debate:

"[T]he notion that somehow not talking to countries is punishment to them, which has been the guiding diplomatic principle of this administration, is ridiculous…One of the first things that I would do in terms of moving a diplomatic effort in the region forward is to send a signal that we need to talk to Iran and Syria because they're going to have responsibilities if Iraq collapses."

Of course, Mrs. Clinton took the opportunity to burnish her hawkish credentials by disparaging Obama in the aftermath of the debate as "naïve" for his talk-and-see approach.

But what do these proposals, postures, and promises really mean in the heat of contentious partisan primaries? It is hard to say for certain because we cannot truly assess the extent to which ideology or stubbornness will affect actual presidential behaviour. After all, George W. Bush campaigned on a modest foreign policy of no overseas nation-building and protecting the civil rights of Arab-Americans. Real objectives can be hidden during a campaign, or altered by the fast-moving realities of international affairs once the candidate takes office.

Additionally, cabinet appointments can temper ideology. A respected realist like Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel, an prominent war critic within the Republican Party might score a prominent and influential position even if one of the more neoconservative members of his party ascends to the White House. The State Department is also staffed with career diplomats whose background and knowledge of negotiating techniques and positions predates the neoconservative grip fully that took hold of Washington under W. Bush. We have witnessed over the past eight years the tensions that exist between the recently appointed ideologues and the career diplomats; some stories recount Liz Cheney engaging in sensitive meetings with key heads of state in the absence of the US Ambassador to the nation in question, not to mention the frustrations of Secretary of State Colin Powell and recently even his successor Condoleezza Rice.

These variables suggest that even the likes of Mitt Romney, if victorious, could change his tune once January 2009 rolls around, wishing to quickly establish for himself a blockbuster legacy. The ability to execute that, however, does depend upon the ground conditions in both Israel and Syria. First and foremost, the region would have to avoid another military flare-up even close to what it experienced in the summer of 2006. Writing mid-summer, I cannot be certain that ever-fragile Lebanon will not dissolve into chaos before you read this article. But given that a mere handful of incidents have transpired directly between Israel and Syria over the Golan border itself since the cessation of hostilities in 1973, we can hope that at least that status quo holds.

Syrian President Bashar Assad's so-called re-election in 2007, in which he faced no opponents by design, as well as the re-election of a meaningless rubber-stamp parliament, have solidified his hold on power. His confidence is obvious, as indicated by his inauguration speech that quite remarkably focused almost exclusively on domestic issues like economic growth, nearly bereft of the pan-Arab rhetoric and hawkish posturing that observers have come to expect.

Furthermore, the political opposition in Syria is a complete joke that the regime need not even bother to discredit, because their blundering incompetence accomplishes that task brilliantly. The most prominent example of their incapacity was the invitation to Israel by Likud Party Parliamentarian Yuval Steinitz and subsequent visit of a Lebanese operative named Farid Ghadry who camps out in Washington posing as the head of the "Reform Party of Syria", a phantom organization with more supporters on the Wall Street Journal editorial board than in all of Syria.

One must mention the investigation under the auspices of UN Chapter 7 into the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a longtime Syrian/Saudi protégé whose increasingly tense relationship with Damascus culminated in a devastating car bomb on Valentine's Day, 2005. The inquiry, which despite being highly politicized, could still lead to devastating sanctions should it prove explicit involvement on the part of the Syrian regime, although the odds of direct proof incriminating the Syrian President himself seem long.

The next US president must also correct Bush's folly in focusing America's democracy effort on Lebanon, a tiny country with a peculiar sectarian electoral system and a horribly weak central government that has never failed to invite foreign powers to manipulate its sects as regional proxies. The idea that a functioning democracy in Lebanon will inspire grassroots reform in the region is ludicrous. Wealthy Arabs from the Gulf countries are not likely to return from Beirut more inspired by its "democracy" than by the drinking, gambling, and prostitution binges Lebanon infamously affords them. Expending whatever remains of America's regional credibility on behalf of the unproven Saudi stooges currently governing Lebanon must come to a halt, because it is simply not in the interests of the United States.

The last piece, of course, is the political disposition of the Israeli public. They are governed by the most democratically evolved political system in the region, which is therefore the least predictable. With a strong prime minister and a mandate directly from the White House to make peace, however, I do believe the majority would accept a "land for peace" proposal. A calculated yet dramatic move, much like Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1978, could be envisioned on Assad's part so long as he receives full political cover from the US as well as the Arab League. History has shown that the Israeli public, even in its hawkish sectors, can be wooed successfully by a genuine extension of the olive branch.

All in all, the road to Damascus is a compelling path that not every leader has had the heart to take. But circumstances will change dramatically in January of 2009. Should the region avoid another pointless war between now and the US presidential election, and should the next president see the value and relative ease of facilitating an Israel/Syria "land for peace" deal, America could take a major step towards rehabilitating its regional image in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims, while simultaneously cropping the tentacles of Iran, remaining a trusted benefactor of the Jewish state, and protecting its traditional alliances in the Middle East. Quite simply, no other course of action can achieve more for America' regional interests than brokering a long-awaited peace between Israel and Syria.

GEORGE AJJAN is a Republican activist and member of the Arab American Institute’s National Policy Council.
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The Road from Damascus

JILLIAN BECKER says that the present Syrian government is too aggressive and untrustworthy for substantive Israeli or American overtures

George Ajjan (in his article "The Road to Damascus") argues that the President of the United States could and should broker a "land for peace" deal between Syria and Israel, that it could be done with "relative ease" and would achieve a number of desirable ends: It would be good for the President's legacy, and good for the image of America in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims; it would weaken Iran; it would be supportive of Israel, and at the same time reinforce traditional US alliances in the Middle East; and it would boost the chances of a Republican victory in the 2008 presidential elections.

With so much good to be achieved, and with no serious practical or political impediments in his way, it would seem deliberately perverse on President Bush's part not to have done it. What could have stopped him? "After all", Mr. Ajjan writes:

"George W. Bush campaigned on a modest foreign policy of no overseas nation-building." But, he concedes, "objectives can be ... altered by the fast-moving realities of international affairs once the candidate takes office."

So what happened that changed George Bush's foreign policy? Nowhere in his article does Mr. Ajjan mention what it was. Yet it was nothing less than the invasion of the United States on the 11th of September 2001 in the name of Islam. That was the historical event that necessarily re-shaped America's foreign policy. The invasion, the destruction of part of New York and the Pentagon, the killing of some 3,000 people brought about the change, not "neoconservatives" getting the President in their "grip", nor blind idealism driving him to drag his country into wild foreign adventures. George Bush's hope and wish that dictatorships such as those of Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran could become democracies is indeed idealistic - though hardly ignoble - but it was 9/11 that unleashed the dogs of war, not his hopes and wishes.

True, after the defeat of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, his aim was and remains to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq. His enemies in his own country hope he will not achieve it, more because they want George Bush and the Republican Party humiliated than because they have any alternative policy. Even many of his supporters doubt that he can achieve it, because they are not convinced that Afghans and Arabs are capable of the responsible citizenship essential for democracy. They were perhaps surprised at the high turn-out of voters when elections were held in Iraq, but if they now maintain that one election does not a democracy make, there are no developments to prove them wrong.

More than anything else, what prevents development towards democracy is a vicious insurgency, promoted and assisted by Syria in alliance with Iran. The US has reacted to Syria's aggression-by-proxy (carried out not only in Iraq, but also through Hezbollah in Lebanon against Israel) with a change of the policy that had been tried patiently for 30 years by successive US administrations without success. It was called "constructive engagement" and had in fact amounted to precisely what Mr. Ajjan calls "rewarding uncooperative behaviour" by allowing Syria to occupy Lebanon and illegally import Iraqi oil. President George W. Bush made the change and in May 2004 he imposed economic sanctions on Syria.

A few months later, in September, Syria began holding secret talks with Israel. For the first time since official but fruitless negotiations had broken down in 2000, meetings took place between agents of the two governments. These unofficial discussions stretched over a period of nearly two years and certain "understandings" were reached that could have become the basis for a peace agreement. A document was drafted covering questions of security, borders, normalization of relations, and water rights.

Israel would withdraw slowly - over five to 15 years - from the Golan Heights, from which Syrian forces had rained death and destruction on part of northern Israel until the Israelis captured them in 1967. Until the withdrawal was complete, a demilitarized buffer zone would be established in the form of a "park" which both Syrians and Israelis could freely enjoy. An ultimate border would be negotiated and guaranteed by the UN and the US. Hostile actions between the two countries would cease - a clause that presumably required the complete cessation of Syrian-backed terrorism against Israel, by Hezbollah in particular. A peace treaty would be signed and normal bilateral relations established.

The issue of water, vital to Israel and a main reason why peaceful relations with Syria are desirable to the Israelis, was to be settled by Syria undertaking not to obstruct the flow of the Upper Jordan River into Israel as it had done in the past. Israel in its turn had pumped water from springs in the Golan that would have flowed to Syria to replenish the shrinking Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias). Both countries badly needed a workable agreement on this issue. The establishment of the imaginative Park would, among other pleasant and practical functions, help to safeguard the water resources for both of them.

The draft document made good reading, but like a recipe for a dish that is never cooked, it remained on the shelf. Neither government even acknowledged that talks had taken place, let alone that agreement had been reached. Why? A fairly compelling reason may have been the fact that the US refused to mediate between Damascus and Jerusalem. If there was a moment when President Bush might have successfully brokered a deal between Syria and Israel, it was then, when they had all but shaken hands on their "understandings". But he made it clear that while he had no objection to talks between Israel and Syria taking place, he would not be involved in them.

It is more than likely that Basher Assad, the Ba'athist dictator of Syria, had permitted the talks chiefly because he saw them as an indirect way to get concessions from the United States after President Bush had imposed sanctions on his country. While it is possible that he wanted peaceful relations with Israel for their own sake or for the safety of Syria's water supply, and while he certainly wanted the return of the Golan Heights, he also, and it seems most strongly, desired to be relieved of the embargo. Consequently, when he was made to understand that there was to be no trading off an agreement with Israel for a lifting of sanctions by the United States, he disowned the discussions and nullified their result.

Was this a disappointment to the Israelis? Would Israel like the draft document to be dusted off now and made use of in renewed official talks? I think not. I do not agree with Mr. Ajjan that a majority of Israelis would support more 'land for peace' conferences now. The government may want them, but it is the most unpopular government in Israel's history, and too many of its diplomatic initiatives go against public opinion. Especially where Syria is concerned there is unlikely to be much public enthusiasm for conceding land. Israelis have been given no reason to trust Assad. Nothing indicates that he seriously desires peace with I